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I. ABSTRACT
This paper examines the recent definition of a right to water in international law by considering how it addresses the critical aspects of
quantifying thresholds, reporting on progress, and establishing accountability. The disparity between rhetoric and progress in actually
realising basic water supplies for the world population grows ever
starker, and therefore the contribution now possible following the
definition of binding international legal obligations and procedures
deserves the broadest possible consideration. Whilst sharing the limitations of our present international legal system, the right to water provides a workable threshold definition regarding the actual quantity of
water supplied as a state obligation. Although constrained by both
procedure and the international system itself, the current legal framework provides opportunities to pursue an effective and real time reporting mechanism. Procedures for accountability are a limiting factor
171
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at the present time; procedural improvement may arise from nontreaty sources of international law.
H. EMERGENCE OF A RIGHT TO WATER IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW
On the 12 ' of November 2002, the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("CESCR") adopted General
Comment Number 15 ("GC15"), called "The Right to Water."' Such
comments are "a crucial means of generating jurisprudence, ' providing a method by which members of the Committee may come to an
agreement by consensus regarding the interpretation of norms embodied in the Covenant [International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights]." With 146 nations signing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), 4 the Covenant is widely recognised as a cornerstone of the framework of international human rights law and provides the means for states to identify
their international legal responsibilities to respect, protect, and fulfil
the rights of an individual to water. GC15 significantly begins the process of crystallising the substantive legal obligations of nations and the
international community in the context of human rights and water.
Whether GC15 is regarded as law rather than jurisprudence is not only
a matter of academic interest, but one that will also be determined by
the states' practice evolving in its wake.

GC15 presents states with a

legal framework and reporting requirement, through which they may
bring to the attention of the international community the status and
progress in realising the "right to water" for the population within their
jurisdiction. Whilst this concept of benchmarking and reporting on
1. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and CulturalRights, General Comment 15 The Right To Water, U.N. ESCOR,
(2002),
E/C.12/2002/11
3,
U.N.
Doc.
Sess.,
Agenda
Item
29th
http://ww.unhchr.ch/htmi/menu2/6/gcl5.doc (last visited Sep. 30, 2004) [hereinafter GC15].
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 871 (8th ed. 2004) (defining jurisprudence as "the
study of the general or fundamental elements of a particular legal system, as opposed
to its practical and concrete details.").
3.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N., FACT SHEET No.] 6

(REv.1),

THE

COMMITTEE

ON

ECONOMIC,

SOCIAL

AND

CULTURAL

RIGHTS,

http://www.unhchr.ch/htrnl/menu6/2/fsl6.htm#6 (last visited Mar.14 2003) [hereSee generally MATrHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE
inafter CESCR FACT SHEET 16].
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE
ON ITS DEVELOPMENT (1995) (examining the work of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights).
4. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, POVERTY REDUCTION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A PRACTICE NOTE 3 (June 2003),
http://www.undp.org/poverty/practicenotes/povertyreduction-hunanrights0603.pdf.
See also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 6 I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter ICESCRI.
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water supply provision is extensively practiced by engineering and
planning professionals at the national level, GC15 presents an opportunity to create binding legal commitments that harness the resources
of the international community to assist all states in providing basic
water supplies.
Prior to the adoption of GC15, a human right to water only gained
explicit expression in two international agreements where the right
applied to only certain people, and lacked explicit definition as to the
states' obligations.' States have not therefore been bound to report on
their status and progress in the water supply provision to the international community, and neither have the parameters for reporting been
explicitly defined in international law. Reporting has, however, occurred as a result of collaboration with international organizations, but
these statistics tend to be aggregated averages for an entire population
and are not a binding determination of an individual's status.
GC15 establishes nine core obligations, supported by a raft of provisions detailing the wider aspects of the right to water. The nine core
obligations are non-derogable and have immediate effect.' The compliance strategy established by the ICESCR in 1989 requires states to
include "right to water" data in their self reporting regime to the
CESCR.' GC15 explicitly requires an obligation to identify and report
on right to water benchmarks.8 "Right to Water" benchmarks monitor
state practice towards meeting the nine core obligations. The 1987
Limburg Principles provide further guidance upon the implementation of the ICESCR.9 Whilst states may adopted a wide range of such
benchmarks and indicators, specifying a threshold for the minimum
quantity of domestic supply serves as a useful example for an examination of how GC15 is likely to influence state practice.
In order to keep the international community focused on the
plight of the world's population who fail to realise their right to water,
and indeed if international support is to be focused on its remedy,
GC15 must require states to develop meaningful indicators and also to
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1456, 1465-66,
art. 24(1) & art. 24(2) (c); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of U~scrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 196, U.N.
Doc A/180 (1980).
6. GC15, supra note 1, atparas. 17,37 & 40.
7. ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 16-17. The specific details for this reporting were
adopted under CESCR General Comment 1. General Comment 1 Reporting by States Parties, U.N. OHCHR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1989/22 (1989), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ (Symbol) /38e23a6ddd6cOf4dcl2563edOO51cde7?
Opendocument [hereinafter Reporting by States Parties].
8. GC15, supra note 1, at paras. 53-54.
9. See generally The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 43d Sess., Annex, Agenda
Items 8 & 18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17 (1987) [hereinafter Limburg Principles]
(detailing the nature and scope of states' obligations under the ICESCR).
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report effectively upon progress in realising that right. Over the
longer term GC15 must have direct effect upon the provision of a remedy to those people affected. Becoming overwhelmed is not difficult
given the complexity of this problem and no doubt significant criticism
of the approach must be overcome before states consent in practice to
its obligations. Fundamental objections include the fact that the
ICESRC framework endorses government programmes rather than
protecting individual rights,'" that African states consent to the ICESRC
on paper but fail to comply with its reporting requirements," and that
in the absence of a law requiring rich States to assist poor states, the
right to water will only be realised as a result of goodwill.
However, given that a legal framework now exists requiring the
identification of right to water benchmarks and factual reporting by
the State, this paper asks three questions. First, whether specific quantitative indicators of supply are a requirement under GC15 (and uses
minimum domestic supply quantity as an example), second, whether
the legal framework for reporting such an indicator is likely to generate an international remedy to a violation of the right to water, and
third, the paper examines how accountability for realising the right to
water is established.
A. THE PURPOSE OF THE RIGHT TO WATER.

GC15 addresses the substantive legal basis of the right to water,
from the orthodox perspective of obligations of the state party." Whilst
the purpose in recognising this right is introduced in general terms,"'
its overall scope is understood from the analysis of the comment as a
whole.'4 A reading of the comment as a whole yields a purpose comprising of six explicit elements with respect to the obligations of the
State:

10.

HENRYJ. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTExT:

LAw, PoLrrIcs, MORALS 274-75 (1996).

11. Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, An Overview Of The Impact Of The InternationalCovenant On Economic, Social and CulturalRights In Africa, COMMUNITY LAW CENTRE SocIo
ECONoMIc RIGHTS PROJECT, May 30, 2002, at 11-12 & 14 (unpublished article, at
Impact of Socio-economic rights in
www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/docs2002/
Africa.doc.
12. See RIcHARD CLAIt.ON & HUGH ToMuINSON, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 101
(2000) (explaining that the orthodox perspective prohibits states from legislating by
treaty, unless the treaty is enacted by the states' legislature).
13. See GC15, supra note 1,at para. 1 (outlining the general purposes of GC15).
14. See STEPHEN R. RATNER &JASON S. ABRAMS, AccOUNrABILnlY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 155 (2d ed. 2001)
(suggesting six purposes in pursuing accountability with regard to criminal violations
of human rights law, including "promot[ing] a sense ofjustice" and "deter[ing] future
violations," both purposes apply in the case of the right to water).
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i.

Realization of a right for leading a life in human dignity."

ii. The entitlement of everyone "to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic
uses.

iii. A "guarantee that the right to water is enjoyed without discrimination ...
and equally..." 7

iv. "[T] he right to seek, receive and impart information concerning
water issues.""
v. National obligations of the State to respect, protect and fulfil the
right to water."
vi. International obligations to cooperate, refrain from interference
and sanction, and to prevent violations by organisations of which the
state is a member or which it administers.0
B. THE SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO WATER.
1. Immediate Substantive Obligations
GC15 requires the state to give priority to specified practices identified in nine core obligations that are both non-derogable and have
immediate effect.2 ' These can be organised into three categories reflecting the societal level at which the obligation is seen to have an effect.

Table I Immediate Core Obligations of the Right to Water
At the National Level
i. To adopt and implement a national water strategy and plan of action addressing the whole population...it should include right to
water indicators and benchmarks
ii. To monitor the extent of the realization, or the non-realization, of
the right to water.
iii.
To adopt relatively low-cost targeted water programmes to protect
vulnerable and marginalized groups.2

15.

GC15, supra note 1, at paras. 1 & 11.

16.

Id. at para. 2.

17.

Id. at para. 13.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at
Id. at
Id at
Id. at
Id. at

para. 12(c) (iv).
paras. 21-29.
para. 30-36.
para. 37.
para. 37(g)-(h).
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At the Community Level
iv. To ensure the right of access to water and water facilities and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged or
marginalized groups.
v. To ensure physical access to water facilities or services that provide
sufficient, safe and regular water; that have a sufficient number of
water outlets to avoid prohibitive waiting times; and that are at a
reasonable distance from the household.
vi. To ensure equitable distribution of all available water facilities and
services.

23

At the IndividualLevel
vii. To ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water, that is
sufficient and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease.
viii. To ensure personal security is not threatened when having to
physically access water.
ix. To take measures to prevent, treat, and control diseases linked to
water, in particular ensuring access to adequate sanitation.'
2. Continuing Substantive Obligations
In addition to these immediate obligations, GC15 provides a raft of
requirements for the gradual development of the overall foundation
for the right to water. These requirements bridge the gap between the
immediate obligations and the overall purpose of the right to water.
The requirements which the state must render accountable are summarised as follows:
Table 2 Continuing Obligations of the Right to Water
Access to effective justice or appropriateremedies.
Victims of violations should be entitled to adequate reparation, including compensation, satisfaction, or guarantees of non repetition."
Access to information and decision-making.
Relevant authorities must ensure that actions are warranted by law
and that there is consultation, disclosure of information, legal recourse, and legal assistance. 26
Transposition/ incorporationof treaty provisions
To enable local remedies and adjudication of violations 7
Education and encouragementof the judiciary and public "
Collaborationof actors other than states2
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at para.
Id. at para.
Id. at para.
Id. at para.
Id. at para.
Id. at para.

37(b)-(c), (e).
37 (a), (d), (i).
55.
56.
57.
58-59.
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Table 8 shows the relationship between the purpose of the right
and its immediate and continuous substantive requirements. Regardless of the immediacy to demonstrate compliance at the international
or individual level of reporting, accountability creates procedures binding the state to self administer the implementation of its right to water
obligations. The procedures will need to demonstrate consistency, as
well as accessibility, transparency of state practice, and reporting in
order to ensure a determination of whether state practice realises the
purpose of the right to water with respect to the individual. GC15 is
not a complete source for these procedures; as they are to be found
under the broader ICESCR framework and the Limburg Principles,
which guide GC15's implementation.
III. AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO
BENCHMARK A MINIMUM QUANTITY OF DOMESTIC SUPPLY?
Numerous investigations of water use have unraveled the dilemma
faced by White, Bradley, and White in their 1972 study "Drawers of
Water," when they remarked that "[p]recisely how [water use] differs
from group to group.. .is not clear."' Today that picture is far clearer"'
and the notion that a minimum volume of water required as a basic
human need can be realistically quantified lends itself to the concept
of right to water benchmarking. Such a threshold is gaining recognition in constitutional and domestic legislation,' but in general, the
state's national water policies may still lack statutory enforcement and a
requirement to report in the public domain. The fact that such indicators failed to improve, lead Gleick to say that "our inability to meet the
most basic water requirements of billions of people... resulted in
enormous human suffering and tragedy and may be remembered as
our century's greatest failure."'
29.

Id. at para. 60.

30.
GILBERT F. WHITE, DAvID J. BRADLEY & ANNE U. WHITE, DRAWERS OF WATER:
DOMESTIC WATER USE IN EAST AFRICA 109 (1972).
31.
See generally JAMES K. TUMWINE, DRAWERS OF WATER 1I: 30 YEARS OF CHANGE IN
DOMESTIC WATER USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH IN EAST AFRICA, UGANDA COUNTRY

STUDY (John Thompson ed., 2001), http://www.iied.org/docs/sarl/dow-uganda.pdf
(providing an in-depth analysis of the water needs and usage of different groups in

Uganda).
32. See S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution Act 1996) § 27(b)-(c) (Health care, food, water
and social security), http://www.oefr.unibe.ch/law/icisf00000html; § 3 & §25 of Re1997,
Act
108
of
Africa
Water
Services
public
of
South

www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Legislature/wsa97.PDF
ECONOMIC

AND

SOCIAL

RIGHTS,

RIGHT

TO

WAXER

.

See also The CENTER FOR
FACT

SHEET

#3:

WATER

IN

INTERNATIONAL & CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (providing further examples of constitutional
legislation), http://cesr.org/node/view/449 (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
33. Peter Gleick, The Human Right to Water, I WATER POL'Y 487, 498 (1999),
http://www.thewaterpage.com/Human%20Right.pdf.
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A. ARRIVING AT A QUANTIFIABLE THRESHOLD

GC15 prefaces the core obligations by introducing the definition of
and necessity for determining the amount of water that is adequate:
"An adequate amount of safe water is necessary to prevent death from
dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related disease and to provide
for consumption, cooking, personal and domestic hygienic requirements."" This definition is made explicit in the body of the text and is
summarised in table 3.
Table 3 GC15 - Scope of the definition of "adequate" domestic water
supply
Use

Commentary

Location

in

text of GC15.

Prevention of No further definition provided
Dehydration
Consumption

From both drinking and foodstuffs.

Para. 2
Para.

12(a)

n.13

12(a)

Personal

Means the disposal of human excreta.

Para.

Sanitation

Water is necessary for personal sanitation
where water-based systems are adopted.

Cooking

Water introduced to food during cooking
and water coming into contact with food
during preparation.
Personal cleanliness and hygiene of the
household environment

n.13
Para. 29
Para. 37(i)
Para. 12(a)
n.13

Personal and
household

Para.
n. 13

12(a)

hygiene

GC15 establishes personal and domestic uses as the supply baseline
and gives them priority over all other uses." Under GC15, other uses
affecting livelihood and subsistence ' should be given consideration,
but any allocation decision cannot exclude or discriminate on the basis
of personal or domestic use. "
The quantity of water available for each person must correspond to
World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines, and these guidelines
are identified in two documents: one by Bartram and Howard," and

GC15, supra note 1, at para. 2.
Id. at para. 6.
Id. at para. 7 (noting the duty established by art. 1, para. 2 of the ICESCR,
provides that people may not "be deprived of [their] means of subsistence").
Id. at para. 12(c)(iii).
Guy HowARD &JAMIE BARTRAM, WoRLD HEALTH ORG., DOMESTIc WATER
QUANTITy, SERVICE LEVEL AND H-ALTH 1 (2003),
http://www.who.int/water-sanitationhealth/diseases/en/WSHO302.pdf (last visited
Oct. 9, 2004).
34.
35.
36.
which
37.
38.
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one by Gleick.3 9 Gleick's report proposes that "50 litres per person per
day of clean water should now be considered a fundamental human
right."4" This amount is applicable in all cases and is derived from an
analysis of four constituent uses, "drinking water for survival, water for
human hygiene, water for sanitation services, and modest household
needs for preparing food."4 These uses are consumptive, meaning that
the use prevents its reuse; thus regardless of the volume withdrawn
from a source, an individual needs access to a minimum of 50 litres per
day. 2 Gleick also suggests that adopting such a minimum threshold
requirement represents a different planning logic enabling equitable
resource allocation based upon sustainable ecosystems.
Bartram and Howard review "the requirements for water for
health-related purposes to derive a figure of an acceptable minimum to
meet the needs for consumption (hydration and food preparation)
and basic hygiene."" They conclude that the application of norms for
water quantity should include "advocacy for access not quantity, the
monitoring and evaluation with progress in meeting international and
national goals for water supply, prioritising interventions and applications within specific contexts, such as emergencies."" They find that
"the debate regarding quantity is not related to volumes of water available but by the level of service provided," since "[i]ncreases in quantities of water used will only be achieved through upgrading of service
level." They argue that "many of the health benefits ultimately accrue
from proper water usage and good hygiene behaviours [as] simple
provision of infrastructure alone is unlikely to maximise health gains.""
Bartram and Howard establish four service levels, at the "basic"
level around 20 lcd of water is collected and making effective use of
that quantity through daily practices, such as hand washing, becomes
an essential component of that level of service in order to control disease transmission," They find that "[t]here remains no doubt that ensuring at least a basic level of service remains a key international
goal..." but recommend that "[w]here at least basic access is already
assured for all, a priority is to increase the numbers of households that
reach the intermediate access level, where the evidence suggests fur39. Peter H. Gleick, Basic Water Requirementsfor Human Activities: Meeting Basic Needs,
21 WATER INT'L 83, 83, 87 (Mar. 1996).
40. Id. at 83 & 90.
41.
Id. at 83.
42. Id. at 84.
43. Id. at 90.
44. HowARD & BARTRAM, supra note 38, at Executive Summary.
45. Id. at 24.
46. Id. at 25. For example a rural well may yield 50 litres per capita per day ("lcd"),
but a community may not be able to use that amount when they have to carry it a significant distance to their homes.
47.
Id.
Id. at 22, tbl.6.
48.
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ther major improvements in health are achieved."" "Currently, only
47% of the global population has access to this level of service, a figure
significantly lower than global access to improved sanitation of 60%."'"
Bartram and Howard, therefore, provide that 20 lcd represents a
minimum international goal in that the amount reduces the level of
health risk from very high to medium." However, whilst this may be a
realistic objective, at least 50 lcd would be required to reduce the level
of health risk to a realistically acceptable level." In practice getting
such quantities of water into the home is determined by the distance
from home to source. A high yielding source could not provide such a
level of access if it takes 5 to 30 minutes per trip to collect.
Considered together, the guidance provided by these two documents is not inconsistent. Both documents represent an ongoing duty
of the state that begins by the provision of 20 lcd and satisfies the international requirement for minimum provision when a level of 50 lcd
is achieved.
There is intense debate in the human rights movement regarding
rights with relative applicability and those with absolute applicability. '
Whilst benchmarks arguably reflect cultural considerations, those
benchmarks will be relative and thus widely different. This margin is
diminished when we adhere to the priority set by GC15. The benchmark explains that states should seek to set a minimum threshold requirement, with respect to the right to water below which a person
would die from dehydration, would be exposed to water related disease, would fail to achieve basic personal and domestic hygiene, or
would fail to drink or prepare food adequately. As previously shown,
the guidance of GC15 establishes an absolute minimum acceptable
quantity, and a higher minimum acceptable quantity that accommodates the variable elements of health risk.
GC 15 provides a basis for the minimum quantity of supply influenced by special circumstances, "[w] hereas the right to water applies to
everyone, States parties should give special attention to those individuals and groups who have traditionally faced difficulties in exercising
this right... '"" an interpretation should consider inter alia cultural relativism 6 ; non discrimination" and subsistence demands.' Thus, whilst
the minimum quantity may vary between communities in a country,
51

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 26 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 22, tbl.6.
Id.
Id.
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 10, at 192.
GC15, supra note 1, para. at 16(a)-(h).
See id. (listing a variety of groups and their water requirements).
Id. atparas. 14-15.
id. at par a. 7.
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the purpose of the benchmark is the same for all persons. The benchmark establishes the parameters of "equitable and reasonable utilization," whilst ensuring a fundamental requirement for human existence. Thus, States may decide to raise the benchmark, but cannot
lower it.

Unlike the expression of a minimum supply quantity in policy instruments, GC15 creates an international legal obligation upon the
state to ensure that such levels are realised and required by domestic
An understanding of the legal basis establishing this
legislation.'
benchmark is then a necessary first step in developing compliant state
practice in monitoring and reporting on progress in its achievement.
B. THE LEGAL BASIS

FOR BENCHMARKING THE MINIMUM QUANTITY OF
DOMESTIC SUPPLY

The elaboration of the right to water builds upon the two main pillars of the ICESCR, in which States Parties "recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living,"" and the "right of everyone to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.""2 Whilst water is an implicit prerequisite for realisation of
human rights, water did not feature explicitly in the ICESCR in 1966.
GC15 rectifies this omission in no uncertain terms since the nine core
obligations it establishes are both non-derogable and take immediate
effect.6" Two core obligations that concern quantity of water supply:
Core obligations
States parties have a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at
the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights enunciated in the Covenant. In the Committee's view, at least a number of
core obligations in relation to the right to water can be identified,
which are of immediate effect:
(a) To ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water, that
is sufficient and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease;
(J) To adopt and implement a national water strategy and plan of action addressing the whole population... [the plan] should include

59. United Nations: Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700, art. 5-6 (establishing the basis for
equitable and reasonable water resource allocation in international water law).
60. GC15, supra note 1, at para. 46.
61.
ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 11, para. 1.
62. Id. at art. 12, para. 1.
63. GC15, supra note 1, para. 37.
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methods, such as right to water indicators and benchmarks, by which
progress can be closely monitored .. (A
"[A]ccess to the minimum essential amount of water" ' is then explicitly linked to the duty to monitor progress by benchmarks and indicators, thus providing both the substantive and procedural elements of a
rule of law. The key to its application is an understanding of the concept of "access" and the fact that the right to water is not realised through
any single indicatorbut by the net effect of several.
That "access" may be a responsibility delegated by government
does not exonerate states from their responsibilities regarding the
right to water. When access is not realised as a result of acts of commission or omission by the state or its agents, then the lack of access
represents a violation of the right to water. ' Such a violation is likely to
be determined with respect to proof of state practice following the
procedural guidance in "good faith." A state consenting to report on
the right to water must "address the different components of adequate
and cover all persons residing in the
water [including sufficiency] ...
State party's territorialjurisdiction...." '
Without referring to a minimum quantity indicator, it is unlikely
that such a report could demonstrate compliant state practice. Therefore, critics argue that the duties of a state consenting to the ICESCR
include the obligation to fulfil the right to water and to report on its
achievement, which is given specific procedural interpretation to include an indicator of minimum domestic supply quantity under
that
provide
The
Limburg Principles specifically
GC15. '
"[q]uantitative information should be included in the reports of States
parties in order to indicate the extent to which the rights are protected
in fact." '
In order for the international requirement for a minimum quantity
of domestic supply to be harmonised with engineering practice and
domestic policy, its definition must be known to and be accepted by
water sector professionals, and ultimately be supported by domestic
law. In this respect it is important to emphasise that this definition is a
human rights based definition, it does not concern an average provision to a community, it concerns provision to an individual. As this
process develops its authors will also need to nurture an acceptable
practice of state reporting on the right to water, since as will be shown,
this is likely to be the weakest component of the present foundation
for realising the right to water.
64.
65
66.
67.
68.

Id. at para. 37(a), (f).
Id. at para. 37(a).
Id. at paras. 42-43.
Id. at para. 53.
Id. at para. 25.

69.

LimburgFrincipes,supra noIte 9, at pala. 79.
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IV. IS THERE AN EFFECTIVE MECHANISM FOR REPORTING ON
THE RIGHT TO WATER?
Guidance on the process of establishing benchmarks will require
the participation of the public and private sectors as well as International Organizations." In addition, the CESCR intends to work with
state parties on "scoping" of benchmarks, "which will then provide the
targets to be achieved during the next reporting period."7' The process, in itself, is likely to result in informal professional networks of information exchange. However this will be in addition to the formal
means of exchanging information through a State self reporting
mechanism. It is a core obligation of GC15 to monitor progress," and
a requirement of the ICESCR to report on achievement and observance of this right. The basis for the reporting mechanism is contained within General Comment 1,7' and the Limburg Principles."
Administration of the right to water reporting mechanism rests
with the CESCR.7 This committee was not formed as a requirement of
the ICESCR, but was established subsequently under the authority of
the UN Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC")." The committee
presently consists of 12 members who are elected by ECOSOC and
each serve a one year term of office.'3 The committee was formed in
1985, and meets for three weeks, twice a year. To date the Committee
has held 14 sessions. The "function of the Committee is to monitor
the implementation of the Covenant by States parties..." the Committee seeks to determine through a variety of means whether or not the
norms contained in the Covenant are adequately applied to States Parties. " " [T] he Committee can also assist Governments in fulfilling their
obligations under the Covenant by issuing specific legislative, policy
and other suggestions....".' Whether in fact States do self report is read70. GC15, supra note 1, at paras. 48-49 & 60.
71. Id. at para. 54.
72. Id. at para. 37(g).
73. ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 16.
74. Reporting by States Parties,supra note 7, at para. 1.
75. Limburg Principles,supra note 9, at paras. 74-82.
76. See generally GC15, supra note 1 (outlining the CESCR's role in administering
water reporting).
77. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COMM.
ON ECON., SOC. & CULTURAL RIGHTS: MONITORING THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL

RIGHTS, at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/

(last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
78. Rules of Procedure of the Committee, U.N. ESC, 3d Sess., Rules 9-10, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1990/4/Rev.1 (1993); see also OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSIONER
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, TREATY BODY DATABASE: COMMITTEE MEMBERS BY TREATY,
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Committeefrset?OpenFrameSet (last visited Sept.
12, 2004) [hereinafter UNCHCR TREATY BODY DATABASE] (listing the current members
of the Committee).
79. CESCR FACT SHEET 16, supra note 3, at para. 6.
80. Id.
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ily determined from the UNHCHR website."' To date some 347 reports
have been submitted under the ICESCR, but 166 reports are as yet outstanding. In comparison with other international human rights conventions, this is average reporting compliance.
Table 5 Reporting Status for Human Rights Framework Conventions
Convention

CEDAW

ICEARD3
ICESCR!4
ICCPRn
CRC"
CAT87
Average

of
of Total number of Percentage
No. of reports No.
required reports
reports
reports required
submitted
submitted
overdue
69.6
515
225
740

964
347
349
281
223
-

418
166
176
153
161
-

69.6
67.6
66.4
64.7
58.1

1382
513
525
434
384

66.0

-

A basic analysis of the relationship between non-reporting States and
their domestic water supply level suggests that at present States achieving low levels of per capita domestic supply of water are more unlikely
to submit reports to the CESCR.
Table 6 Relationship Between Domestic Water Supply Level and
State Reporting Under ICESCR: States supplying less than 15 lcd.

Rank I State

I c1cle

I C CRAccession * I Number

o

overdue

81.
UNCHCR TREATY BODY DATABASE, supra note 78, DOCUMENTS BY TREATY, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited Oct. 11, 2004) (detailing State reporting status by treaty).
82. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
supra note 5, at UNCHCR TREATY BODY DATABASE, supra note 78, DUE BY TREATY, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/newhvduebytreaty?OpenView (last visited Oct. 23,
2004), SUBMrI-rED BYTREATY, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/newhvsubmittedbytreaty?OpenView (last visited
Oct. 23, 2004), OvEIRUE BYTRFATY, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/newhvoverduebytreaty?OpenView (last visited
Oct. 23, 2004) [hereinafter collectively UNHCHR TREATYDATAWEBsrrEs].
83. International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, at UNHCHR TREATY DATA WEBSITES, supra note 82.
84. ICESCR, supranote 4, at UNHCHR TREATY DATA WEBSITES, supra note 82.
85. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at UNHCHR TRFATYDATA
WEnsrrEs, supra note 82.
86. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 5, at UNHCHR TREATY DATA
WEBSITES, supra note 82.
87. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, at UNHCHR TREATY DATAWEBirEs, supra note 52.
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reports
1

Gambia

2
3
4
5
6
7

9

4.5

29-Dec-1978 a

3

Mali9"0

8.0

16-Jul-1974 a

3

Somalia"
Mozambique92
Uganda"9
Cambodia94
Tanzania 5

8.9
9.3

24-Jan-1990 a
Non signatory

3
n/a

9.3
9.5
10.1

21-Jan-1987 a
06-May-1992 a
11-June-1976 a

3
2
3

88. GLEICK, supranote 39, at 89 tbl.10 (discussing the limitations of these I/c/d
data and ranking 55 countries where the reported average domestic water use was
below 50 l/c/d.)
89. UNCHCR TRATY BODY DATABASE, supra note 78, at RATIFICATIONS AND
RESERVATIONS BY COUNTRY: GAMBIA, ICESCR, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet (last visited Oct. 24,
2004); REPORTING STATUS, OVERDUE BY COUNTRY: GAMBIA, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvoverduebycountry?OpenView&Start=60&
Count=I5&Collapse=61.3#61.3 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
90. UNCHCR TREATY BODY DATABASE, supra note 78, at RATIFICATIONS AND
RESERVATIONS BY COUNTRY: MALI, ICESCR, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFraineSet (last visited Oct. 24,
2004); REPORTING STATUS, OVERDUE BY COUNTRY: MALI, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvoverduebycountry?OpenView&Start=1 00&
Count=15&Expand=104#104 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
91. UNCHCRTREATYBODYDATABASE, supra note 78, at RATIFICATIONS AND
RESERVATIONS BY COUNTRY: SOMALIA, ICESCR, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet

(last visited Oct. 24,

2004); REPORTING STATUS, OVERDUE BY COUNTRY: SOMALIA, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvoverduebycountry?OpenView&Start= 155&
Count=15&Expand=155#155 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
92.

UNCHCR TREATY BODY DATABASE, supra note 78, at RATIFICATIONS AND

RESERVATIONS BY COUNTRY: MOZAMBIQUE, ICESCR, at

http:/w/Aw.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet

(last visited Oct. 24,

2004); REPORTING STATUS, OVERDUE BYCOUNTRY: MOZAMBIQUE, at

http://ww-v.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvoverduebycountry?OpenView&Start=1
Count= 15&Expand= 1144#114 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
93. UNCHCR TREATY BODY DATABASE, supra note 78, at RATIFICATIONS AND

14&

RESERVATIONS BY COUNTRY: UGANDA, ICESCR, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet

(last visited Oct. 24,

2004); REPORTING STATUS, OVERDUE BY COUNTRY: UGANDA, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvoverdebycounty?OpenView&Start=1
Count=l5&Expand=1 76#176 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
94. UNCHCR TREATY BODY DATABASE, supranote 78, at RATIFICATIONS AND

76&

RESERVATIONS BY COUNTRY: CAMBODIA, ICESCR, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet

(last visited Oct. 24,

2004); REPORTING STATUS, OVERDUE BY COUNTRY: CAMBODIA, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvoverduebycountry?OpenView&Start=28&
Count=I5&Expand=28#28 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
95.

UNCHCR TREATY BODY DATABASE, supranote 78, at RATIFICATIONS AND

RESERVATIONS BY COUNTRY, UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA: ICESCR, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet

(last visited Oct. 24,

2004); REPORTING STATUS, OVERDUE BY COUNTRY UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, at
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Central
African Republic"'

13.2

8-May-1981 a

3

9

Ethiopia97

13.3

11-June-1993 a

2

10
11
12

Rwanda
Chad"
Bhutan'O

13.6
13.9
14.8

16-Apr-1975 a
9-Jun-1995 a
Non signatory

3
2
n/a

98

Average no of overdue
reportsper State

2.7

Number of
Party = 10

Total No of reports overdue= 27

States

*The letter "a" signifies accession was the means of consenting to the
convention. Non signatories are not required to submit reports.

Table 7 Relationship Between Domestic Water Supply Level and
State Reporting Under ICESCR: States supplying up to 50 lcd

Range of total do.

I No o States ITotal number o

Average number o over-

http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvoverduebycountry?OpenView&StartCount= 15&Expand=179#179 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
96. UNCHCR TREATY BODY DATABASE, supra note 78, at RATIFICATIONS AND
RESERVATIONS BY COUNTRY: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC,

76&

ICESCR, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet (last visited Oct. 24,
2004); REPORTING STATUS, OVERDUE BY COUNTRY: CENTRALAFRICAN REPUBLIC, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvoverduebycountry?OpenView&Start=28&
Count=15&Expand=32#32 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
97. UNCHCR TREATY BoDY DATABASE, supra note 78, at RATIFICATIONS AND
RESERVATIONS BY COUNTRY: ETHIOPIA, ICESCR, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet

(last visited Oct. 24,

2004); REPORTING STATUS, OVERDUE BY COUNTRY: ETHIOPIA, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvoverduebycountry?OpenView&Start=52&
Count=15&Expand=57#57 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
98. UNCHCR TREATY BODY DATABASE, supra note 78, at RATIFICATIONS AND
RESERVATIONS BY COUNTRY: RWANDA, ICESCR, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet (last visited Oct. 24,
2004); REPORTING STATUS, OVERDUE BY COUNTRY: RWANDA, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvoverduebycountry?OpenView&Start=136&
Count=15&Expand=140#140 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
99.

UNCHCR TREATY BODY DATABASE, supra note 78, at RATIFICATIONS AND

RESERVATIONS BY COUNTRY: CHAD, ICESCR, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet

(last visited Oct. 24,

2004); REPORTING STATUS, OVERDUE BY COUNTRY: CHAD, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvoverduebycountry?OpenView&Start=28&
Count=15&Expand=33#33 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
UNCHCR TREATY BODY DATABASE, supra note 78, at RATIFICATIONS AND
100.
RESERVATIONS BY COUNTRY: BHUTAN, ICESCR, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet

(last visited Oct. 24,

2004); REPORTING STATUS, OVERDUE BY COUNTRY: BHUTAN, at

http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvoverduebycountry?OpenView&Start=l
Count= 5&Expand=20#20 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
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mestic water use led
-Below 15 lcd
25 to 30 Icd
35 to 50 lcd

Party
10
8
11

overdue reports
27
14
20

due reportsper State
2.7
1.8
0.6

Whilst there is no intended suggestion here of an unwillingness on
the part of a state to report'1 , it is apparent that the lower the domestic
water use in a country the more unlikely it is that such States would
bring this to international attention through the existing ICESCR reporting mechanism. However, non-reporting creates a critical limitation on the contribution international law could make through providing a harmonised legal framework for information exchange on water
supply provision. Those states most needing and most likely to benefit
from international support, by failing to report, will fail to trigger a
legal rights based remedy from the international community.
A second critical limitation of the reporting mechanism arises from
the frequency of reporting. States are required to report two years after they become party to the ICESCR and every five years thereafter,
three "overdue" reports, therefore, represents a time span of either 12
or 15 years. There is extensive experience amongst the international
community in establishing global data banks for water supply statistics
and monitoring mechanisms are often established alongside international development programmes; a decade is not an unusual time
frame in which full achievement is envisaged.
The International
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade [IDWSSD] (1981-1990)
was such an example in which the WHO established a monitoring facility."u
Continued international efforts presently find expression
through the Millennium Development Goals ("MDGs") " and a monitoring system established under the U.N. Statistics Division." Target
10 of the MDGs aims to halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water by 2015, the estimated cost this
T

101. The 18 Nations represented on the CESRC currently have a combined backlog
of 11 reports. Of these 18 nations, 10 are original signatories that went on to ratify the
covenant; two others acceded to the covenant.
102.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION MONITORING, at

http://www.who.int/water-sanitation-health/monitoring/en/
2004).
103. UNITED

NATIONS,

U.N.

MILLENNIUM

(last visited Sept. 12,

DEVELOPMENT

GOALS,

at

http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
104.
U.N. DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, STATISTICS DIVISION,
MONITORING PROGRESS TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT
GOALS, at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi-highlights.asp (last visited Mar. 20,
2003) [hereinafter U.N. MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS]. "[T]he United Nations

Statistics Division coordinates data analysis and maintains the database..." related to
the MDG selected indicators. Id.
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goal may be between $9 billion and $30 billion per year.'5 U.N. guidance on country level reporting on the progress of MDGs suggests at
least one report should be prepared every 2 to 3 years.' 0 Given the
limitations of the ICESRC reporting mechanism it is not presently a
viable or better alternative. As a result, the ICESRC reporting mechanism is unlikely to exercise a timely legal effect upon States providing
development aid, in order to promote compliance with core obligations under the right to water. The Bureau for Development Policy of
the United Nations Development Programme ("UNDP") reports that:
In developing countries, coverage of improved drinking water sources
rose from 71 per cent in 1990 to 78 per cent in 2000-leaving an estimated 1.1 billion people without access to safe water. Progress fell
far short of the goal set in 1990 to reach universal access to safe water
by 2000. Not only was the goalpost moved to 2015, the new MDG target was lowered from universal coverage to halving the proportion of
people without access to safe water. Thus, the new target [i.e. MDG
Target 10] is nearly five times less ambitious than the initial one. At
the current rate of progress, the world is on track to reaching the new
target for safe water by 2015. ' 0'

Ideally, a rights based reporting mechanism allows states to provide
frequent reports, which are also consistent with international development aid reporting systems in terms of time frame and content.
Such a marriage of reporting mechanisms could provide mutual benefits for providers and recipients of water supply investments while enabling a rights-based approach to water supply underpinned by international law. U.N. guidance on MDG reporting promotes principles of
national ownership, capacity development, and minimising costs and
efforts, suggesting that existing U.N. Country Team reporting re8
quirements already provide much of the information needed.' Whilst
country level data collected through UN Country Team support is often of differing quality, a minimum requirement is completion of a
"Status at a Glance" Chart, where a country may respond in four pos105. WORLD BANK, THE COSTS OF ATTAINING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, 2,
7, at http://www.worldbank.org/htrml/extdr/mdgassessment.pdf (last visited Mar. 24,
2003) (summarizing SHANTAYANAN DEVARAJAN ET AL-, DEVELOPMENT GOALS: HISTORY,
PROSPECTS AND COSTS, WORLD BANK Poucv RESEARCH WORKING PAPER).
106. U.N. DEVELOPMENT GROUP, REPORTING ON THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
2001),
(Oct.
para.
14
NOTE,
GUIDANCE
LEVEL:
THE
COUNTRY
AT

http://www.worldvolunteerweb.org/development/mdg/background/MDG_011106
GuidanceNational-reports eng.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
107. JAN VANDEMOORTELE, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, BUREAU FOR
2002),
8
(July
FEASIBLE?
MDGs
THE
ARE
POLICY,
DEVELOPMENT

http://www.undp.org/governance/docsaccount/are-the-mdgs-feasible.pdf
Apr. 7, 2003).
108.

REPORTING ON THE MILI.ENNIUM

supra note 106, at para. 3.

(last visited

DEVELOPMENT GOAIS AT THF COUJNTRY

.F.W.T.,
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sible ways to the question "[w] ill the Goal/Target be met?," the options
being probably, potentially, unlikely or no data."n
Modification of the reporting mechanism established under the
existing ICESRC rights is possible based on the legal framework that
non-state Actors "0 and agents of the state,"' hold existing obligations
regarding reporting. Additionally, the ICESRC allows states to make
special reporting arrangements with UN agencies.' 2 Part II of the Limburg Principles also provide guidance upon how states may make their
reporting more relevant, this includes, inter alia, commissioning special
studies,"' and formal collaboration with non-governmental organizations."4 In addition, the Limburg Principles establish that the CESCR
"should consider inviting States Parties to comment on selected topics
leading to a direct and sustained dialogue with the Committee.""'
Regardless of any changes that may occur, it is particularly important that states do in fact report to the CESCR. An analysis of why this
is not presently the case is beyond the scope of this research."' However, regarding the reporting on the right to water some comments are
relevant.
Producing a specific report on the right to water may prove more
acceptable to states than reporting on the right as part of the present
"aggregate" report system. Even so, concerns regarding the negative
impact of reporting should be tempered by an understanding of the
purpose of such a report. The role of the CESCR is
to develop a constructive dialogue with States parties and seeks to determine through a variety of means whether or not the norms contained in the Covenant are being adequately applied in States parties
and how the implementation and enforcement of the Covenant could
be improved so that all people who are entitled to the rights enshrined in the Covenant can actually enjoy them in full"7.
The CESCR's comments on reports do not carry any binding legal
status, but failure to act upon them is seen to "show bad faith in im-

109.

Id. at Annex 3: Status at a Glance.

110.
See GC15, supra note 1, at para. 60 (including non state actors, such as WHO,
FAO, UNICEF, UNEP, UN-Habitat, ILO, UNDP, and the WTO).
111. See id, at para. 33 (including state agents, such as companies and citizens of that

State).
112. ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 18.
113. See Limburg Principles, supra note 9, at para. 80 (explaining how states may fill
gaps in the reporting process).
114. Id. at para. 77.
115. Id. at para. 88.
116.
See Chirwa, supra note 11, at 11 (listing examples of states satisfying their reporting requirement under the ICESCR).
117. CESCR FACTSHEET 16, supranote 3, § 6.
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plementing ... obligations. '. l. The Committee, in recognising its limited
resources, pursued responses most likely to result in the enjoyment of
the right.

V. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH
ACCOUNTABLE STATE PRACTICE
GC15 envisages that accountable state practice will result from four
procedural requirements:
i. Reporting.States are required to report to the CESCR 2 years after
ratification of the ICESCR and every five years thereafter."'
ii. Access to information and decision making, such that any actions by

the State are ensured to be compatible with the ICESCR.In

[n
iii. Access to justice / reparation,such that " lational ombudsmen, hushould be permitted
institutions
man rights commissions, and similar
to address violations of the right." 2 Persons or groups should have
access to judicial or other appropriate remedies at the international
level.'

iv. Incorporation of treaty obligations. Parties are "[required to use] all
appropriate means.. .particularly the adoption of legislative measures"
3
States should
in the implementation of their Covenant obligations.
strategies and
legislation,
therefore2 review, amend or change existing
policies.
In addition, GC15 envisions that the state will encourage the legal pro-

society to understand and act in accordance with the
fession and civil
2

right to water. 1
The state is therefore the authority accountable to its citizens for
meeting international obligations and it is the responsibility of the
state to establish the mechanism to determine domestic accountability,

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Reporting by States Parties,supra note 7, at para. 2; GCI5, supra note 1, at para. 54.
GC15, supra note 1, at para. 56.
Id. at para. 55.
See Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the InternationalCovenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 9: The domestic application of the
Covenant, U.N. ESCOR, COMMITEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTs, 19th

Sess., Agenda Item 3, , U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24, para. 4 (Dec. 1998),
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ (Symbol)/4ceb75c5492497d9802566d5O0516036?
Opendocument (last visitedJune 17, 2003) [hereinafter GC9].
123. ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 1.
nnmq 4.ri-47
(C.l Fi ci4r nnre 1 nat
124.
58.
11 r o t l, at r .--1,
at
paras. 49 & 58.
note
5,
supra
125. GC1
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again reflecting the orthodox opinion of accountability under international law."6 If the
State party concludes that it does not have the capacity to undertake
the monitoring process which is an integral part of any process designed to promote accepted goals of public policy and is indispensable to the effective implementation of the Covenant, it may note this
fact in its report to the Committee and indicate2 the
nature and extent
7
of any international assistance that it may need.
Table 8 shows the relationship between these accountability procedures, and the purpose of the right and state obligations. In order to
analyse whether these procedures contain sufficient scope and sensitivity to determine whether state practice is contributing to the realisation
of the individual right to water we must find out whether:
* Accountability concerns international as well as domestic obligations;
* Accountability is concerned with monitoring the individuals right
or the states procedural obligations and;
* Accountability will identify the non-performance of a state's obligations.
A. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEVELS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

GC15 provides three mechanisms relevant to accountability at the
international level. The mechanisms include, reporting to the CESCR;
access to judicial or appropriate international remedies; and the incorporation of treaty obligations into domestic legislation, thereby recognising the raft of substantive provisions concerned with international
cooperation.'28 GC15 provides that "failure of a State to take into account its international legal obligations regarding the right to water
when entering into agreements with other States or with international
organizations" violates the right to water," and requires that "States
parties have to respect the enjoyment of the right in other countries."
130There is, however, no explicit international mechanism identified
for cooperation, information exchange between states and reporting

126. See CLAYION & ToMLINSON, supra note 12, at 101 (explaining how states are
responsible for incorporating international treaties in order to ensure domestic compliance).
127.
Reportingby States Parties,supra note 7, at para. 3.
128.
See GCI5, supra note 1, at paras. 54-57.
129. Id. at para. 44(c) (vii).
130. Id. at para. 31.
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on shared water resources that would render such obligations accountable.
Accountability in its international context thus remains implicit in
GC15, accountability is not an immediate core obligation and there is
no explicit mechanism holding a state accountable for the effect of its
actions upon another state when there is no bilateral agreement that
incorporates right to water obligations. Multilateral water resource
agreements, such as the U.N. Convention on the Law of NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses may, however, bind
states parties to obligations of cooperation related to the utilisation of
shared sources."' Thus, in the case of a dispute between states not governed by a shared waters agreement, GC15 would not provide a binding legal mechanism for settlement. However, since it is likely that
these states are party to the ICESCR, then the principles contained
within GC15 are an applicable source of law, albeit without identifying
a clear mechanism to apply them.'
At the national level, procedural mechanisms require access to information, decision-making, and justice. As these processes become
enabled they will provide a form of accountability to the public directly. Formal reporting to the CESCR on these procedures is an indirect, but explicit means to achieve accountability for the nine core obligations.'
It is therefore possible that accountability under the right to water
is seen as a requirement for a State to report upon how it meets "its
own" international obligations since there is only an implicit requirement to report upon the trans-national impacts of a states practice. If
indeed reporting is seen as measurement of the States own programmes to meet international obligations, then there is also the risk
that accountability will be too narrow in scope to show how these programmes then result in an individuals right to water being realised.

131. U.N. Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, supra note 59, at art. 8. The convention establishes the legal basis for shared

use of a watercourse concerned with "equitable and reasonable" utilization. Id. at art.
5. Additionally, the convention imposes an obligation not to cause significant harm.
Id. at art. 7. A general obligation to cooperate exists in the convention. Id. at art. 8.
"[T] he requirements of vital human needs" receive special consideration. Id. at art. 10,
para. 2.
132.

U.N. CHARTER, STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE, art. 38, para.

(1)a.
133.

See supra tbl.1.
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B. ACCOUNTING FOR STATE PRACTICE OR AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT?

The immediate core obligations of the state require a programme
of action to be managed by the state,' and GC15 requires that:
Before any action ...by the State party, or by any other third party, the
relevant authorities must ensure that such actions are performed in a
manner warranted by law, compatible with the Covenant, and that
comprises:
a) opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected;
b) timely and full disclosure of information on the proposed measures;
c) reasonable notice of proposed actions;
d) legal recourse and remedies for those affected; and
e) legal assistance for obtaining legal remedies.' 3
The meaning of "relevant authorities" here is limited to the state authorities as no international authority is suggested.'
The CESCR
whose "primary function ... is to monitor the implementation of the
Covenant by States parties," does not possess the legal authority to enforce compliance; its activities are limited to "constructive dialogue
with States parties ... to determine.., whether or not the norms contained in the Covenant are being adequately applied ... and how the
implementation and enforcement of the Covenant could be improved....
State practice in realising the right to water must consist of procedures concerned with public access to information, decision-making,
and justice. Accountability, therefore, takes two forms under the right
to water. First, accountability focuses on state practice and. what the
state does to meet its international obligations, as well as the relationship between those obligations and the people. Second, accountability
establishes procedures to report on and monitor these obligations under the CESCR. There are two potential loopholes in this approach,
firstly there needs to be accountability in the case of a state failing to
act, addressed in section 5.3, and there must also be a mechanism es-

134. "[T]he entitlement includes the right to a system of water supply and management that provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the right to water."
GC15, supra note 1, at para. 10.
135. Id. at para. 56.
136. See id. (containing no mention of international authorities).
137. CESCR FACT SHEET 16, supra note 3, § 6.
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tablishing accountability between the State and the people. Both cases
concern the legal maxim of "quis custodiet ipsos custodies"?"
The most critical provision establishing accountability between the
people and the state occurs in the core obligation requiring that a national water strategy and plan of action is adopted and reviewed "on
This legally
the basis of a participatory and transparent process....'
binding review procedure requires a state to make itself accountable to
its citizens with respect to the realisation of an individual right to water.'" The relationship between public participation and state practice
in international environmental and watercourse law is not only increasingly expressed in recent treaty practice,"' and through the work of UN
bodies,'42 but is also of current academic interest.4 The notion of an
individual having recourse to an international remedy is an ideal expressed in law,'44 but realistically and pragmatically local remedies must
first be available and exhausted for remedies to practically work. Individual possession of a right to question government in relation to its
practice on water supply is politically charged and much work remains
to be done to provide government with the understanding and capacity to develop such fora,
C. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NON-PERFORMANCE BY A STATE

A failure to act in accordance with the obligations contained within
'
the right to water represents a violation "through acts of omission.
A failure to act includes a failure to adopt a national water plan and
failure to incorporate treaty provisions." Three mechanisms to identify the failure exist. The CESCR may request a state party to provide

138. Who will watch the watchers?
139. GCI 5, supra note 1, at para. 37(f).
140. Limburg Principles, supra note 9, at para. 76. "The preparation of reports should
also be an occasion to review the extent to which relevant national policies adequately
reflect the scope and content of each right, and to specify the means by which it is to
be realized." Id.
See, e.g., Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision141.
Making and Access to justice in Environmental Matters,June 25 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517.
142. See, e.g., Geneva Strategy and Framewor*for Monitoring Compliance with International
Watercourse Agreements : A Proposed Compliance Review Procedure, U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, 2dSess., Agenda Item 5(c), U.N. Doc. MP.Wat/2000/5 (1999).
143. See, e.g., Jonas Ebbesson, The Notion of Public Participationin InternationalEnvironmental Law. 8 Y.B.OF INT'L ENvrL. L. 51 (1997); see also Melvin Woodhouse, Is Public
Participationa Rule of the Law of International Watercourses?, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 137
(2003).
144. See GC9, supra note 122, at para. 4.
145. GC15, supra note 1, at para. 43; see also Limburg Principles, supra note 9, at
para.72.
146. GC15. sura note 1, at para. 43. See also CLAYTON & TOMLINSON. supra note 12. at
99-103 (discussing the failure of states to incorporate international treaties).
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specific information, which it considers essential to assess progress, '
thus bringing the violation to the attention of the U.N. Commissioner
on Human Rights. Secondly, a state may express the view that another
state party is not complying with its obligations. " ' Thirdly, an individual has the right to international reparation and justice recognised in
the event of the exhaustion or non-provision of local remedies. 9
However, the likelihood of such courses of action occurring depends largely upon specific circumstances and localised pragmatic
remedies being entirely exhausted. Ratner and Abrams argue that:
"Although arguments based on legal duties in treaties or custom
should and do influence decision-makers, they hardly determine the
policies of states and international organizations regarding accountability, criminal or otherwise. Ultimately, their responses to various
atrocities will rely principally on independent moral, social, and political considerations. ' Na
GC15 emphasizes that "it is particularly incumbent on States parties, and other actors in a position to assist, to provide international
assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical which
enables developing countries to fulfil their core obligations.'.'. However, GC15 does not provide any explicit mechanism for retribution in
the event of a violation.' 2 Thus, whilst circumstances may exist where
the imputation of a state's failure to act signifies a desirable outcome,
any alternative that realises the right to water on the ground will always
have a political, moral, and social advantage for the decision makers
and victim alike.
It is suggested that that non-binding international mechanisms
such as the joint monitoring programme established to monitor the
Millennium Development Goals [MDGs], ' and public domain bilat-

147. Limburg Principles, supra note 9, at para. 90. "Whenever the Committee is not
satisfied that the information provided by a State party is adequate for a meaningful
assessment of progress achieved and difficulties encountered it should request supplementary information, specifying as necessary the precise issues or questions it would
like the State Party to address." Id.
148. Id. at para. 73. "In accordance with international law each State party to the
Covenant has the right to express the view that another State party is not complying
with its obligations under the Covenant and to bring this to the attention of that State
party. Any dispute that may thus arise shall be settled in accordance with the relevant
rules of international law relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes." Id.
149.
See CLAYrON & TOMLINSON, supra note 12, at 4 (stating that "the recognition of
the right of individual petition under a number of human rights treaties has meant
that international human rights tribunals can now decide cases brought by individuals
against states.").
150. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 14, at 155.
151. GC15, supra note 1, at para. 38.
152.
See id. at paras. 56-59 (listing remedies and accountability, but no explicit mention of a mechanism for retribution).
153.
U.N. MILLENNIuM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, supra note 104.
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eral monitoring reports'" could provide an early warning system for
gross right to water violations arising out of the failure of States to act,
if they incorporate right to water benchmarks. '
It is also evident that specialised organisations emerge and reorient
themselves in the wake of the adoption of GC15 to promote awareness
and understanding of the right to water, and they in turn will act as a
lobby to seek pragmatic remedies.'" As knowledge of the right to water
becomes more widespread and influences the nature of public domain
reporting on water supply it will create an increasingly forceful argument that states must act in good faith.' 7
VI. DISCUSSION
A right to water under international law is emerging within our
present understanding of treaty law and existing international human
rights instruments. A particular and significant outcome has been a
workable definition of a threshold for the minimum quantity of individual domestic supply. This notion has, to date, proven difficult to
pin down. The notion of a threshold for the minimum quantity of individual domestic supply is a remarkable outcome, since it represents
consensus in a complex and multi-disciplinary field. However, the
practical effect of the definition of this right will depend upon the
compliance of states with respect to an essentially self reporting mechanism. This mechanism, as it stands, appears to be insufficiently frequent and insufficiently adhered to, to have a tangible influence upon
development assistance in real time. There is however sufficient scope
in the existing legal framework to suggest that these deficiencies can
be overcome through a concerted effort by the international community to harmonise reporting systems and marry information exchange
and development cooperation with rights based obligations. The present opportunity afforded by the Millennium Development Goals is
both a timely and appropriate stimulus to begin this work.
154.

See, e.g., U.K. DEP'T FOR INTr'L DEV., STATISTICS ON INT'L DEV. (Oct. 2003),

http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/ (lastvisited June 17, 2003) (citing examples of bilateral
aid for international development).
155. GC15 clearly establishes that State obligations extend to ensuring due regard
for the right to water by third parties and non state actors active within the jurisdiction
of the State or acting internationally as agents of the State. GC15, supra note 1, at
paras. 24, 30, 36, 38, 53 & 60. This would mean that the legal benchmarks recognised
by that State become the means to account for the due regard of the non state actors.
156. See, e.g., CENTRE ON HOUSING RIGHTS AND EVICTIONS RIGHT TO WATER PROGRAM,
at http://www.cohre.org/water.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2004) (providing an example
of an organization lobbying to protect water rights).
157. See GC15, supra note 1, at paras. 34 & 38. In this context a significant component of the determination of "good faith" concerns a State taking "necessary and feasible steps towards the realization of the right to water," as well as seeking support for
these activities from the international community. Id. at para. 40.
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Even so we may still find our achievements limited to what appears
on paper. Under the right to water, accountability is expressed as a
means to attract support for solving problems rather than attracting
penalties. Reporting upon failure to realise the right is therefore seen
as a mechanism to attract international support and awareness. The
role for a third party, acting between individuals and states is not entirely clear at the international level. Under the present definition,
principles lending themselves as sources of law relevant to transboundary violations are presented, but there is no explicit mechanism
to require settlement."t In addition, provisions to render states accountable for their failure to act with respect to the right are identified, but none of these offers a direct path to a remedy. Therefore, it is
both useful and relevant to ask what more must be done to operationalise a right to water under international law.
This study considered the legal nature of the right to water within
the confines of its present expression in sources of treaty, where limitations arise from the lack of supreme authority to require compliance.
The progressive crystallisation of a right to water will indeed be judged
by the emergence of state practice demonstrating consent to the obligations defined in the right to water, but we must question whether in
fact states presently posses the belief that they are bound by such law,
regardless of the technicalities of its incorporation into treaty. It is
probably fair to say that the predominant reaction of those who enjoy a
right to water to the statistics and images of those who do not is one of
sympathy and not one of abhorrence. Whilst the impact upon lives
and livelihoods as a result of an inadequate basic supply of water are
well known, we have yet to fully consider this as being along side violations of fundamental human rights. The way forward is, therefore,
likely to reside jointly in changing the way we see the problem as well
as encouraging state consent to the obligations being defined under
existing treaty frameworks.
Acronyms / Abbreviations
CAT
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or
degrading treatment or Punishment
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Against Women
CESCR
United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
CRC
Convention on the Rights of the Child
ICEARD International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination
158. Trans-boundary in this context means where the actions of State A affect individuals right to water in State B, and do not depend on their being a contiguous geographical boundary or necessarily a shared surface water source.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICCPR
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights
IDWSSD International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade
General Comment No 15 "The Right to Water."
GC15
Litres per capita per day
LCD
Millennium Development Goals
MDGs
UN ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council
UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Table 8 The Relationship Between Purpose, State Obligations and
Accountability Procedures under the Right to Water
Purpose of the Right
Realisation
of "entitleto
ment
sufficient,
safe, acceptable, physically accesand
sible
affordable
for
water
personal
and domestic uses."

Guarantee
that "the
to
right
is
water
enjoyed
without
discrimination and
equally..."

Realisation
of a fight
for "leading a life
in human
dignity"

The right
seek,
to
receive and
impart
informacondon
cerning
water
issues,

National
obligations of
the
State to
respect,
protect
and
fulfil the
right to
water.

International
obligations
to cooperate,
refrain from
interference
sancand
tion, and to
prevent
violations by
memstate
ber / adminoristered
nisations.

State Obligations

Continuing Obligations

Immediate Core Obligations
" National
Water
Plan
" Monitoring
" Ensure
Minimum
Quantity
" Ensure
Personal
Security
" Measures
to Prevent DisLow Cost
Options

a Ensure
right of
access
- Physical access
- Equitable distribudon

eReparadon

oDisclose
information

* Action

* Incorpora-

warranted
by law

tion of obligations
- Collaboration
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Accountability Procedure
y

y

y

y

Reporting

y

y

Access to
information
Access to
justice
Access to
decision
making

y

y

Y

y

Y

y

y

Y

y

y

Y

Incorpo.
ration of
treaty
obligations

Yes if National water
plan propreerly
viewed
Y

y

y
Accounting for
Failure
to Act

-Key

0
a
.
a

>

No clear
mechare
nism
transboundary
waters

Strengths
Nine core obligations are linked by explicit procedures that will enable
domestic state practice to be accountable
Reporting requirement includes benchmarks which will render state accountable for realisation of individuals right to water
Accountability is established under existing international legal framework
for which extensive guidance exists
Establishes legal principles for the right to water.

Key Weaknesses
o State practice is largely self monitored and its effectiveness will depends
upon there being appropriate participation in the review of national water
planning.
* No explicit mechanism to account for failure of the state to act.
• No explicit mechanism to account for trans-boundary right to water violations.

Note: "y" indicates that the accountability procedure would monitor
the obligation.

